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Abstract
Security is a primary concerns when protected communication between mobile
nodes in a averse environment is the requirement. MANETs are more susceptible
to be attacked as compared to the wired networks. These vulnerabilities are due
to the operating principles of the MANET which can not be changed. Securing
MANET is equally important as securing fixed wired networks. Certain level of
security can be obtained form the existing solutions. However, these solutions are
not always neccesarily suitable for wireless networks. Further, ad hoc networks
have their own unique vulnerabilities due to its lack of a fixed infrastructure, that
cannot be protected by these solutions. In order to obtain an acceptable level of
security in wireless ad hoc, existing security solutions should be combined with an
intrusion detection mechanism. Sevral intrusion detection techniques that have
been developed for fixed wired network cannot be applied in this new environment.
Further, energy is also one of the major issues in MANET as the battery life of
the network nodes is limited and once discharged these nodes can not be charged
again.Energy plays a vital role in determining the reliability of the network as
the lifetime of the network highly depends on the energy status of the nodes in
the network. Here we have deviced a method to encorporate both these factors
i.e., security and energy in order to make the network more reliable and secure.
We have merged the IDS with the AODV routing protocol such that there is
not need to deploy a separate IDS part on each node. Using a separate IDS
take considerable amount of processing power of the nodes as well as consumes
energy. Thus, by merging the IDS with the routing algorithm itself we are able
to decrease the energy consumption at each node which enhances the lifetime of
the entire network. Finally we have applied clustering in order to provide stability
to out ad hoc network so that the path determination can be made faster and
effective.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Introduction
As the appearance of mobile computing devices such as laptops, smartphones grew
people started to expect to gain network connectivity. As a result several groups
started working on means to accomplish this task. This led to wireless LANs being
marketed by several companies [1]. However this proposed standard could be used
in two ways, one with the presence of a base station and the other without the
presence of a base station. In the latter case the computers would communicate
to each other directly. This is called as an ad-hoc network. A further specified
case of ad-hoc networks is when the nodes i.e., computers in this case are mobile.
In these cases each node consists of a host and a router on the same device.
This means that the nodes form a network without the use of an external routing
device. When a number of such nodes happen to be near to each other and form
networks, and is called as ad-hoc network or Mobile ad hoc network (MANET).
As we are aware now that MANETs do not have a fixed topology, thus every
single node in the network acts as a host as well as a packet forwarding device
i.e., a router. Further the nodes in a MANET can move in any direction and
are allowed leave the network at any point of time. Because of the absence of a
solid infrastructure these networks are cheaper to deploy but also are restrained
by some factors such as battery and low processing power. Therefore, when the
network grows in size the load on every single node to forward packets to other
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nodes increase which takes a considerable amount of processing power.
In the case of a MANET the topology may be changing time to time, so the
desired and valid paths may change randomly without warning. Thus usual fixed
topology rules and routing algorithms cannot be directly applied to these net-
works [1]. Thus, MANET is among one of the main research areas as they have
grown rapidly through the past several years because of their application areas
such as rescue services, battlefields, mobile conferencing and various other ap-
plications. Also because of the dynamic nature of topology these networks have
and the absence of a centralized monitoring point, these networks become highly
susceptible to several kinds of attacks. These networks suffer from the security
threats that may occur in the wired networks such as passive eavesdropping, au-
thorization, denial of service, etc. At the same time they also suffer threats due to
its wireless properties, such as sleep deprivation, selfishness, blackhole, wormhole,
etc. Trust equality is another major problem in case of ad hoc networks i.e., when
all the nodes are equally trusted they can easily alter, drop control or drop packets.
1.2 Background
Security mechanisms are a must to be used in the wireless ad hoc networks to
counter against the threats. Cryptographic mechanisms are used to provide secu-
rity against certain types of attacks from external nodes but cryptography cannot
provide protection against malicious internal nodes which already possess the re-
quired cryptographic keys. Thus, intrusion detection mechanisms are essential to
detect these internal malicious nodes. Several events in the history have proved
that intrusion prevention techniques, such as authentication and encryption are
not sufficient alone. They usually serve as the first line of defense. However, as
the complexity of the system increases so does the weaknesses, which creates a set
of new security problems. Intrusion detection system serves as a solution to this
problem and can be used as a second line of defence.
3
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Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) can be divided into different categories
based on the mechanisms used for data collection as well as event detection tech-
niques [2]. The requirements for intrusion detection are same for both fixed wired
networks as well as wireless ad hoc networks. However, wireless ad hoc networks
add some other challenges also. Thus, in general the effectiveness of the intrusion
detection solutions designed for fixed networks are somewhat limited for wireless
ad hoc networks and thus are unable to provide complete protection.
1.3 Motivation
Intrusion detection systems developed for fixed networks are not directly im-
plementable in the wireless network environment, and therefore research in the
last few years has focused on securing wireless ad hoc networks(e.g., MANET)
with IDSs [4]. Intrusion detection in wireless ad hoc networks is more complex
and challenging than in fixed networks. Further, wireless ad hoc networks intro-
duced certain new routing protocols which differ majorly from the protocolsbeing
used in wired networks. The nodes are required to be cooperative and perform
the functionality of a router by these protocols; this also implies that the work of
routing is not done by a single cetral body but is divided among the participating
nodes. Because of this nature of the MANET routing protocols the attackers are
provided with opportunities to find the vulnerabilities of the network and can thus
launch new attacks.
Further when we look at the present IDS mechanisms for MANETs, we have
to compromise either on the two side of our requirements i.e., security and energy.
Thus, an IDS mechanism which can provide security as required and also increase
the over all life time of the network by decreasing the energy consumption by the
node is required.
4
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1.4 Organisation of thesis
The thesis is organized as follows: Chapter 2 describes the literature review done
for this thesis. Chapter 3 discusses the different security threats and attacks pos-
sible in ad hoc networks and also give an introduction of the routing techniques
used in ad hoc networks. In Chapter 4 the proposed method i.e., an integrated
routing and IDS mechanism with stable clustering is described and how the pro-
posed mechanism helps in providing security as well as conserving battery lives of
the nodes in the network. Finally chapter 5 concludes with the summary of work
done.
5
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Chapter 2
Literature Review
2.1 Literature Review
In [4], a detailed survey of Manet intrusion detection is given. This gives an
overview of the techniques of Intrusion Detection System (IDS) existing in MANET.
It also discusses various attacks possible MANET, the different IDS architectures
existing in present, and the researches done in past and thier outcome on MANET
is presented inclusively in order to support the idea. In this way a scope of future
research is given based on the several existing security problems.
Nadeem et al [5] gives a survey for the different intrusion detection and preven-
tion approaches for network layer attacks. Here various types of attacks possible
on the MANET are defined. It also describes different algorithms for the detection
of these attacks and defines the different protection techniques for the mentioned
attacks and threats. It also provides an overview of the different intrusion detec-
tion techniques for MANET. The challenges faced by intrusion detection systems
when dealing with ad hoc networks are also described.
In [6], the focus is given on the basic security problem for giving protection to
the mobile nodes in a MANET using multihop connections. An identification of
the security issues and the challenges in designing a security system are provided.
It also reviews the security proposals being made that is used to provide protection
the link-layer and network-layer operations in MANET. It states that a complete
prtotection mechanism should cover both network layer and link layer and thus,
should provide prevention, detection, and reaction as IDS components.
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In [3], the challenges present in the IDS mechanism in wireless ad hoc network
are studied. This paper gives a review of the present techniques and how they are
used to detect different attacks possible on the ad-hoc routing as well as the mobile
nodes. This paper presents the different architecture of intrusion detection which
can be used various types of wireless ad-hoc networks, it also gives an overview of
the different methods wich have been already proposed for IDS response.
Sun et al [7], briefly describes the ad hoc networks in wireless environment. It
also give and overview of the IDS and the protection it provides for the wireless
ad-network. The IDS capabilities for these networks is also discussed. Several
challenges in forming an IDS in wireless ad hoc network is given, it further surveys
the current IDS techniques. It also defines the methods for the union of mobility
and IDS in wireless ad hoc networks.
In [8], an analysis for current IDS for MANET is provied based on reviewing
features. A comparative study is done on order to compare extant IDS methods
based on different factors such as inputs adn outputsof the network, processes,
advantages and disadvantages. Guidelines are proposed in selecting intrusion de-
tection methods.
In [6], the security goals i.e., availability, confidentiality, integrity, authentica-
tion and non repudiation are described. It also gives an overview of the challenges
in ad hoc networks and describes that these challenges can also be used as op-
portunities for meeting the security goals in the network. It also defines secure
routing as a measure to cater security in ad hoc networks and also describes how
key management system can be used to achieve the security goals.
Bononi et al [9], proposed an IDS system which can be implemented in order to
provide assistance to the AODV routing. Here an integrated IDS system has been
described which provides the security features by eliminating the malicious nodes
from the network. Hence, forming a secure cluster of nodes which are trusted and
are part of the network. It shows that the proposed mechanism is able to eliminate
the byzantine nodes and thus provide protection against various attacks.
In [10], a robust clustering algorithm for MANET is proposed so as to mimic
8
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the operations in a fixed network in order to solve the problem of scalability in
case of large MANETs. When we make use of the presently existing clustering
algorithms to calculate each nodes weight, they make use of either one matrice or
are dependent on other devices. This makes the reclusterig rate to increase. Here
a weighted clustering algorithm is defined which makes use of the three different
matrices so as to form stable clusters, these matrices are power, mobility and
workload. This as a result covers all the major factors due to which reclustering
usually occurs.
In [11], the energy constraint of the MANET is discussed and an intrusion
mechanism is defined which copes with the energy constraint. It described that
when a node is used again again it uses its battery more vigorously than other
nodes in the network, thus it will go down very fast and stop functioning due
to fast consumption of battery. Hence, the life of the whole network is affected.
It provides and ids system where the IDS functionality is switched to eligible
nodes after a certain interval of time so that the life time of the network can be
maximised.
2.2 Limitatons of Current Intrusion Detection
Systems
The major dissimalrities of the wired networks and the wireless networks result
in causing severe problems in order to use IDS techniques already existing for the
wired networks in order to provide security and protection for the wireless net-
works [3]. The significant dissimalrity of wireless networks is the lack of stable
infrastructure. In comparision to the wired networks where the fixed switches and
routers act as the traffic analysis centers, MANETs lack such central points where
data collection and auditing of the data can be done by the intrusion detection
system. Thus, at a certain point of time, the traffic data available within the
radio range of the nodes acts as the only available data for auditing, so the IDS
algorithms should be able to make use of this localised data to work on.
9
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The other significant difference in a MANET is the communication pattern it
follows. The constraint such as low bandwidth and limited battery power makes
it more difficult for the user of MANET to use it. Disconnected operations ar
again mostly used in the wireless applications, and so are other different tech-
niques which are purely created for wireless networks. Thus, all these constraints
theorize that the models used for wired networks can not be directly implemented
for the wireless networks.
Likewise, it is not always necessary that the normal and abnormal behaviour in
the case of a wireless ad-hoc networks can always be clearly defined. A malicious
or misbehaving node may be conciliated by an external entity or it may be out
of the normal behaviour due to could be the one that has been compromised, or
merely the one that is temporarily out of sync due to unstable physical movement
for the time being. Thus, IDS may be in a difficult situation to decide between
real intrusions and false alarms.
In brief we must be able to answer these research problem statements in order
to build a reliable and usable IDS for MNANET:
 What qaulifies as an efficient system architecture for creating an IDS systems
that is fit to work with MANETs?
 What can be used as relevant data collection and auditing sources.?
 How a good model can be designed in order to point out the difference
between a normal and abnormal behaviour by the nodes when an attack is
being launched on the system?
2.3 Different Attacks and Security Solutions in
MANET
Mobile ad hoc (MANETs)are networks which are constructed on an ad-hoc basis,
where the communicationg systems are mobile in nature and make use of wireless
10
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links for communication among each other. These do not rely on a centralized
infrastructure or administration server to work.
One of the most active and most interest seeked research topic in the field of
wireless networks, the exclusive feature of MANETs give rise to some new chal-
lenges in the design of the security mechanism. Open network architecture, shared
wireless medium, resource constraints, and dynamic network topology [3] are the
few constraints which MANETs impose.We use the different secuiryt solution in
order to achieve following security services i.e., authentication, confidentiality, in-
tegrity, anonymity, and availability. Thus the security solution should provide
complete protection to the entire protocol stack in order to achieve these goals.
2.3.1 Attacks in Wireless ad hoc Networks (MANET)
There are several network layer attacks or intrusions which are known for MANET
[5]. Here we present a brief introduction of major network layer attacks and list the
several possible types of attacks. Classification of Network Layer attacks in mobile
ad-hoc networks is divided into two main divisions, known as passive attacks and
active attacks, as shown in Figure 2.1
Figure 2.1: Different Types of Attacks in Wireless ad hoc network
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Passive Attacks
Passive attacks are those where the operation of the routing protocol is not dis-
turbed by the intruder but ittries ot getS some important information through
traffic analysis. This in turn can lead to the disclosure of critical knowledge of
the network or nodes like the network topology, node loactions or the identity of
important nodes. Few examples of passive attacks are:
1. Eavesdropping
2. Traffic Analysis and Location Disclosure
Active Attacks
In active attacks, intruders launch intrusive activities such as modifying, injecting,
forging, fabricating or dropping data or routing packets, resulting in various dis-
ruptions to the network [5]. Some of these attacks are caused by a single activity
of an intruder and others can be caused by a sequence of activities by colluding
intruders. Active attacks (as compared to passive attacks) disturb the operations
of the network and can be so severe that they can bring down the entire network
or degrade the network performance significantly, as in the case of denial of service
attacks.
1. Malicious Packet Dropping
2. Routing Attacks
3. Sleep Deprivation Attack
4. Black hole attack
5. Grey hole attack
6. Rushing attack
7. Sybil attack
2.3.2 Vulnerabilities of MANET
The different vulnerabilities of MANET are described as follows [3].
 Wireless Links :MANET nodes are linked through wireless links. The
network is made vulnerable to attacks by these wireless links.. Here the
12
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network access is not required by the attackers to carry out these attacks.
Because of the wireless links the bandwidth of wireless networks is lesser
than the wired networks.
 Dynamic Topology : Due to the mobile nature of the nodes of MANET the
network topology tends to change very often.It is tricky to separate typical
conduct of the system from irregularity in this dynamic environment. Also
mobility of nodes implies that we can’t make assumptions about the nodes,
particularly discriminating ones (servers, and so forth.), which are kept safely
in secured cupboards cupboards as wired systems. Nodes with insufficient
physical security might regularly be at danger of being caught and bargained.
 Cooperativeness :Cooperative nature of the nodes in MANET also gives
rise to a certain problems. Routing algorithms in MANET generally expect
that nodes are cooperative and non-malicious. Thua, an attacker with ma-
licious aim can undoubtedly turn into a necessary routing agent and upset
system operations by resisting the specification gievn in the protocol.
 Absence of a Clear Line of Defense : Because of absence of a clear
line of defense; a MANET can be attacked through any direction. The
division between within system and the outside world is not unmistakably
characterized.
 Limited Resources : Limited resources act as a further hurdle for the
system. There could be a mixture of gadgets on MANET, running from
laptops to hand held gadgets, for example, PDA and cellular telephones.
These will by and large have distinctive figuring and stockpiling limits that
might be the center of new attack.
2.4 Intrusion Detection Systems
An intrusion is characterized as a situated of activities that bargains secrecy,
accessibility, and honesty of a network. Intrusion detection is a security innovation
that endeavors to distinguish the individuals who are attempting to break into
13
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and abuse a network without commission and the individuals who have authentic
access to the netk yet are misusing their benefits. The system could be a host
machine, network component, a firewall, a switch, a corporate system, or any
data framework being checked by an IDS. An IDS, by examining the netwrok
and client’s operations, looking for undesirable and suspicious exercises, might
successfully screen and ensure protection against dangers.
2.4.1 Intrusion Detection Techniques
An IDS can be classified into three main categories based on the approach
being followed for abnormal behaviour or detection of intruder [7] being deployed:
(1) Anomaly based intrusion detection (ABID), which is also referred as known
as behavior-based intrusion detection;
(2) Misuse detection, also known as knowledge-based intrusion detection (KBID)
(3) Specification-based intrusion detection (SBID)
The three main intrusion detection techniques are as follows
 Anomaly-Based Intrusion Detection : Anomaly-based intrusion detec-
tion (ABID) systems flag as anomalous observed activities that that behave
differently than the defined normal behaviour of the system. This system
basically works by detecting the processes deviating from the expected be-
haiour or the nodes behaving abnormaly. The other name used for ABID
sytems is behavior-based intrusion detection. The process of modeling the
normal behavior of network nodes is known as training. The model addition-
ally goes about as a profile of client or system conduct. A profile comprises of
data about the arrangement of parameters which are particularly equipped
to the target being checked. Testing for interruption includes analysis of
the typical or expected conduct model inferred throughout the preparation
stage with the current model of the system or clients.
14
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Figure 2.2: Anomaly Based Intrusion Detection System
 Knowledge-Based Intrusion Detection : Knowledge based intrusion
detection sytems keep up an information base that holds marks or examples
of well-known attacks and searches for these examples trying to discover
them. The basic KBID process is shown in Figure 2.3. KBID relies on
knowledge about attacks so anything not explicitly recognized as an attack
based on existing knowledge is declared as nonintrusive or acceptable. How-
ever, the case of an event or a series of events that has degraded the network
performance can be identified as an unknown attack because it does not
match the existing rules of attacks, and the system can update the knowl-
edge base by adding a new rule. Some KBID systems use expert systems for
intrusion detection. An expert system maintains the knowledge of known
attacks in a knowledge base in the form of a set of rules. Captured audit data
from a monitoring network are translated into facts and then an inference
engine uses these facts and rules present in the knowledge base to detect an
mailicous activity in the network.
Figure 2.3: Knowledge Based Intrusion Detection System
15
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 Specification-Based Intrusion Detection : Generally, SBIDs first ex-
pressly characterize particulars as a set of requirements. Then these details
are utilized to screen the routing protocol operations or system layer opera-
tions to locate strike in the system. The fundamental methodology of SBID
is indicated in figure 2.4. The main step removes the determinations, which
characterize the right oerationality of (for instance) the system or the MAC
layer convention using a set of imperatives. The framework then screens the
execution of the convention regarding the given particular, deviations from
the detail being dealt with as intrusion.
Figure 2.4: Specification Based Intrusion Detection System
16
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Chapter 3
Proposed Work
The mobile nodes ineteracting together in a MANET should co-operate to-
gether and share resources and wireless cababilities in order to enable end-to-end
communication. The work of routers is performed by the intermediate nodes so as
to increase the connectivity of the peers which are not in the radio range of each
other.
It can be attained by efficiently transmitting messages in a multihop transmis-
sion scheme which is determined by an ever changing routing through the radio
channel. Due to the mobile nature of the hosts the MANET scenario taken as a
disturbin system for routing protocols. There are various routing protocols which
have been proposed for this type of scheme such as AODV, DSDV, DSR, OLSR.
However most of these protocols use the cooperative nature of the hosts as an
assumption: but this may not be always feasible in real time systems.
In our work, a hybrid routing protocol has been designed based on AODV
which encorporates the IDS functionalities in itself. This new routing protocol is
called as Intrsion Detection System based AODV(ISAODV) [9]. It is developed
by integrating an IDS with the concept of SUCV identifiers, for MANETs based
on IPv6. SUCV identifiers fulfill the need of having a trusted Certification Au-
thority or Key Distribution Center by providing a protected binding between the
IP addresses of the nodes and the cryptographic values.
IS-AODV utilizes the IDS as the premise for execution of secure AODV di-
recting. To control the conduct of neighbors throughout the course finding and
information sending stages, in IS-AODV every hub screens the activity whose way
18
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incorporates the hub itself. Not at all like Secaodv, when a hub N sees a sus-
pect conduct from a neighbor have, the IDS response in IS-AODV is inactive,
that is, the data about the conceivable hub defilement is not promoted to dif-
ferent hubs. As a response, the hub N does not depend, and does not support
any suspect neighbor hub in the usage of steering and correspondence. Thus, as
long as vindictive hubs are available, just sheltered courses will make due in the
course creation and course upkeep techniques, and a bunch would rise that will
inevitably incorporate just protected hubs. Furthermore, not at all like secaodv,
the proposed IS-AODV plan does not require any cryptography operation in the
moderate hubs.
3.1 System Design
A MANET can be supposed as a group of cooperative nodes which utilize a com-
mon routing protocol. Here we consider the specifications of the routing protocol
to be the normal activity of the system . Nodes which deviate from this defined
normal behaviour are considered as malicious. Thus, the given anomaly-based
IDS works for detecting several attacks by describing an intrusion as a deviation
from the defined normal behaviour.
3.1.1 System Components and Definitions
The two major components of the defined mechanism are as follows:
1) An host and anomaly based IDS mechanism with passive reactions.
2) the Statistically Unique and Cryptographically Verifiable (SUCV) identifiers,
in order to provide a protection bond between the IP and public key without the
requirement of any certification authority and key distribution center.
The goal of our approach is to find a secure route between the source and
destination nodes. We also aim to provide scalability and atabilty to our system by
implementing clustering algorithm which ultimately emerges in an secure cluster
with only the safe nodes being part of it. In order to obtain our goals we first
need to find safe routes and then maintain the route obtained. This can be done
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by using
i) the representation of the AODV routing protocol.
ii) the end-to-end confirmation of end nodes. This verification is gotten by em-
bracing a Public Key Cryptography plan, where keys are certain to hub characters
by method for a SUCV component.
iii) the end-to-end signature check for steering information packets, to distin-
guish any abnormal action by intruder hosts showing up in the began way.
iv) the IDS-based shared perception and control of directing and information
transmissions between neighbor hosts, to distinguish conduct peculiarities.
3.2 Assumptions for the System
In order to implement the proposed mechanism in MANET following assumptions
are made:
1)The source and destination nodes are considered safe.
2)The nodes share a bidirectional link.
3)The nodes are able to hear the neighbours transmission.
4)All nodes except the malicious ones have IDS activated on them.
5)A hash function is distributed with the sytem configuration setting to all the
participating nodes in the network.
6)The MANET is homogeneous.
3.3 System Overview
Figure 3.1 shows the arcitechture of a node actualizing the IDS. All the traffic
flowing through the MANET is occupied by the IDS and for processing by the
AODV routing protocol these packets are also filtered by the IDS . Each bundle
accepted by contiguous hubs throughout a way disclosure methodology is checked,
to check if the parcel is sent by an at one time recognized vindictive hub. Each
packet accepted by the following nodes in a predefined way, is checked to confirm
in the event that it has been undermined. In both cases the packet is quickly
eliminated. At the end of the day, malicious hosts are avoided from the ways they
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endeavor to attack.
Figure 3.1: Proposed IDS node architecture
3.3.1 AODV modifications
i) SUCV ids are added to RREQ and RREP message headers. ii) Being improved
by having information structures about end-nodes, characterized inside detection
system, the AODV steering table is made more association arranged
3.3.2 SUCV identifiers
As compared to the IP addresses, the SUCV identifiers are even ids which are not
related to the implicaions of the topology. Fundamentally, the SUCV id present
the point of interest of a verifiable cryptography tying between a nodes identifier
and its public key (or certificate). It is the work of a node to auto-arranges its
own Crypto-Based Identifier (CBID) by doing the accompanying operations:
1) two cryptographic keys are created i.e, puclic key and private keys (PK and
PrK) is created.
2) evrey node calculates its own CBID: CBID = hash(PK),
3.3.3 RREQ header extension
These extra fields have been added to the RREQ message:
PKS: Source node public key;
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{DIGESTRREQ}PrKS : it is a digest value of the RREQ with the extension
made excluding the destination sequence id and hop count.
IPv6prev: It is the IP address of the previous node from which the RREQ
message has been forwarded when the path is being created from the source upto
the destination.
Figure 3.2: RREQ and RREP extensions
3.3.4 Mutual verification of path
In the figure 4.3,
Figure 3.3: IPv6prev setting
the mutual verification process is defined as follows:
IPv6prev identifies the nodes which have forwarded the packet to the current node
(as indicated by arrows): 1) RREQ will be recieved by the nodes between the
path i.e., N1;
2) N1 initialises IPv6prev value with IPv6S. After that N! forward the RREQ
to its neighbours and also to the source node.
3) S recieves and checks the RREQ forwarded by N1. S then verifies that
IPv6prev = IPv6S, the last recieved RREQ is then compared with the cached
RREQ copy of S. By this procedure S verifies that N1 has forwarded the correct
RREQ message.
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4) Every node which lies between the path from source to destination behave
in a similar fashion as S when forwarding the RREQ messages.
3.3.5 RREP extensions
The following fields have been added to the RREP header
PKD: destination node’s public key ;
IPv6prev: the previous nodes IP address;
{DIGESTRREP}PrKD: RREP message digest with the extention made to the
header included in it.
RREQ ID: the RREQ ID value for which the RREP has been generated;
SEQ No: an image of the sequence number value of the originator of RREQ
for which this RREP has been generated.
3.4 Clustering algorithm
Two mobility metrics [10], Relative Mobility (RM) and Mobility Prediction (MP),
are used in order to observe the mobility of the nodes and are used to determine
the suitability of a node to be the cluster head, this is performed as follows:
 Every node j (1 ≤ j ≤ N for N nodes in the network), when recieves a
two continuous HELLO messages from every one hop neighbouring node i
(1 ≤ i ≤ n) if total number of neighbours is n), the RMij is computed by the
eqaution (3.1). rssij1 and rssij2 are the received signal strength (RSS) which
are percieved from the RSS indicator when the two HELLO message from
the same neighbor are received. From the value of RMij, it can be concluded
that if RMij = 1 , then the node j and its neighbor i are either stable at
a position or are moving with a constant velocity; if RMij is less than 1,
then they tend to come closer to one another; else the distance betwwen the
nodes in increasing.
RMij =
rssij1
rssij2
(3.1)
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 In order take into account the mobility of all n 1-hop neighbors every node,
MPj is calculated by using the standard deviation of RM1j, RM2j, , RMnj
according to the equation(3.2). Though, in order to provide stability to
elected clusters, we prefer RMij ≤ 1 as it is desirable that the cluster heads
stay near to thier cluster members. So, in MPj calculation of the mean of
RMij(1 ≤ i ≤ n) is taken as 1 and not the actual calculated actual mean.
A node j with a lower MPj implies that it does not move away from its
neighbours, so, it is considered as a worthy candidate for cluster head as
compared to its neighbours.
MPj =
√
(RMij −RMij)2
n
(3.2)
here RMij = 1
 While dealing with the energy constraint, we consider not only the Remain-
ing Power (RP) but also Power Decrease Rate (PDR) for each node as the
workload as so that we can balance the power usage and prevent cluster
heads from running out of power quickly. In other words, for each node j,
the PDRj is considered because the RPj deflects the current state of power
level and thus it will loose power if the workload on this node is heavy.
The PDRj at time interval [t1, t2] can be computed using the equation 3.3,
where rpj1 and rpj2 are the remaining power at time t1 and t2, respectively.
PDRj =
rpj1 − rpj2
t2 − t1 (3.3)
Lower PDR value for a node indicates that for the time duration [t1, t2] the
node was not busy. But if a node has been busy in the past it is most likely
that it will ramain busy in the future. From the above analysis we can infer
that any node j is best candidate to be elected as the cluster head among all
its neighbors if its RPj is the highest, its MPj is the lowest and its PDRj is
the lowest.
Thus we can say that a node with the highest wieght is the most eligible
candidate to be elected as a cluster head by comibining these metrices as
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the weight of the node, which is calculated in equation 3.4.
Wj = f1 ∗ e−MPj + f2 ∗RPj + f3 ∗ e−PDRj (3.4)
In equation 3.4, RPj = rpj2, the weighting factors f1, f2 and f3 are set ac-
cording to the different scenarios in the applications, and f1 + f2 + f3 = 1.
When we let f2 = f3 = 0, that is, we take away the effect of power and
workload, our algorithm turns into a mobility-only-based approach.
3.5 Attacker Model
The attacker model considered is focused around dynamic and interior attack sorts.
The arrangement of strike incorporates: Black Hole, Route Disruption, Route
Invasion, Modify and Forward, Denial of Service, End-hub mimic, Coordinated
DOS ambush, RREQ ID assault, IP attacks,coordinated adjoining node strike.
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Chapter 4
Implementation and Results
4.1 Simulation Metrices
In order to evaluate the performance of the system, we simulated a model of
MANET on the ns2 simulator. The IS-AODV model has been derived from the
AODV model provided with the ns2 simulator. We have modified the AODV
according to the proposed mechanism. Also we have derived the routing table for
the simluation.
For the simulation we have considered the following constants.
Simulation time 200 ms Max Speed 25 m/s
Area 1000 ∗ 300 Packet Rate 4 packet/second
Number of Mobile Hosts 20,50 Pause Time 120 sec
Range of transmission 200 m No. of Active Connections 10, 20, 30
Mobility model Random waypoint Number of malicious nodes 10%, 20%, 50%
Table 4.1: Simulation constants
Here we pay attention to the response and access processing overheads of our
proposed scheme IS-AODV, with respect to standard AODV:
i) the increased amount of information contained in the RREQ and RREP
packets,
ii) the additional processing power required for the implementation of the IS-
AODV
iii) the average number of RREQs required to form a safe route.
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The figure 4.1, shows the simulation for 20 nodes initially. The main eval-
Figure 4.1: IS-AODV simulation for 20 nodes
uation metric we considered is a comparision between the average number of
RREQs issued by the source node, in order to establish a connection between
the source(AODV) and the destination node and a safe connection between the
source and destination (for IS-AODV). The average number of RREQs is not the
number of occurences of link failure but is the average number of RREQs which
are required to be sent by the source in order to form a complete route path. This
is obainted for varying number of attacker nodes and under different ,mobility
effects.
We first obtained the throughput and the cbr rate for the network in ns2 along
with the packet delivery rate and the number of dropped packet when we ran the
simulation for 150 sec which is shown in figures below:
The figure 4.2 gives the througput of the routing algorithm when simulation is
done for 20 nodes for a time of 250 secs
The figure 4.3 gives the send recieve ratio and cbr packet delivery rate for the
algorithm under the above mentioned conditions.
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Figure 4.2: Throughput
Figure 4.3: CBR rate and send recieve ratio
The figure 4.4 gives the no. of packets being dropped in the network and
the dpacket delivery ratio desribed as total number of packets recieved at the
destination divided by the total number of packets being sent by the source.
Figure 4.4: Dropped packets and delivery ratio
Here we obtain a graph for the average number of RREQs required for each
working route under AODV protocol in MANET with 50 active nodes and 20
end-to-end connections. The x-axis indicates the hop count of the network. The
percentage of currupted nodes is 50% here. The IS-AODV off (pure AODV) shows
the average number of RREQs required by the source to find a generic route in the
system. The average value is compromised between 1 and 2. The curve IS-AODV
on (safe routes), enduring state portable situation demonstrate the same indexas
a capacity of way length in an unfaltering state versatile situation, IS-AODV
dynamic and half assaulter hubs. The versatility impact of hubs complexities
the safe grouping that would rise given the IDS impact in IS-AODV: hubs that
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mainly ill-use different hubs may detached this information base helpful to make
safe ways. The impact of the safe grouping is demonstrated in the curve IS-AODV
On (safe routes only). The main contrast concerning past bend is given by the
static uniform circulation of hubs in the range. The normal number of Rreqs in
the framework decreases in light of the fact that hubs gain more industrious data
about neighbor hubs, and recognize the agressor by rejecting them in the present
and future way creation process. The gragh is shown in figur 4.5
Figure 4.5: Function of the mobility and hop distance in terms of avg no. of
RREQs
A similar graph for 30 end to end node connections and 50 active nodes is
shown in figure 4.6
Figure 4.6: Average Number of RREQs: hop distance and collision effects
The %age of safe hosts that charge a corrupted host, and the rate of corrupted
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Malicious nodes % safe node % Attacker nodes
10% 11% 28%
20% 50% 25%
50% 38% 36%
Table 4.2: Clustering effect of safe nodes ater 250 seconds: 30 connections, 50 50
mobile nodes
host that have been ran across by no less than one safe host is at first zero. At
the point when these two rate qualities are 100% the system would be totally
clustered.
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Conclusion and Future Work
5.1 Conclusion
Using the proposed method we were able to obtain a secure cluster for the network
where every path shared between the nodes was safe to use in order communicate.
Using IS-AODV, all the malicious nodes are eliminated from the network and all
other nodes are informed about the malicious behaviour of the node. Simulation
results confirmed that the proposed IDS contributes to a transparent clustering
of nodes which eliminate the attackers with a passive reaction. Further using the
PMW clustering algorithm, we were to obtain greater stability of the clustering
by reducing the number of times the rescheduling was being performed otherwise.
5.2 Future Work
The work can be extended in future to further reduce the overheads required in
order to find the safe routes in the network. Further the clustering algorithm can
be integrated with IS-AODV in order to form a scalable stable secure intrusion
detection system which can also conserve the overall enrgy of the network and
thus,increase the lifetime of the system. Further, security against other attacks
can be provided by modifying the IDS mechanism in order to provide more efficient
IDS system for MANET.
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